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JURISDICTION
This appeal is taken from a final judgment of the Third Judicial District, Salt Lake
County, entered by the Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
I.

ISSUES.
1.

Was the Trial Court correct in denying David Allen's objection to jury

Instruction No. 25 directed at the law of trespass.
[Preserved at R. 580:532-533]
2.

Was the Trial Court correct in denying the motion of Susan Allen and

David Allen and ruling that the divorce proceeding between Elizabeth Mueller and David
Allen did not place exclusive jurisdiction in the divorce court regarding Elizabeth
Mueller's claims and that the divorce decree did not constitute res judicata and collateral
estoppel of said claims.
[Issue preserved at R. 131-142;178-179; 516-518; 579:528-531]
3.

Have David Allen and Susan Allen failed to sufficiently marshal the

evidence in support of the verdict.
[This issue first arises in the appeal and is not preserved in the Trial Court. The
issue arises under Rule 24(a)(9) Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.]
4.

Was the verdict supported by the evidence, especially as it found punitive

damages against Susan Allen and David Allen.
[Issue preserved at R. 508-513]

1

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW.
1.

Issue No. 1 requires a determination of whether the jury instruction

correctly states the law. Consequently, a question of law is presented which is reviewed
for correctness. State v. Houskeeper, 2002 UT 118, f 11, 62 P.3d 444; Chapman v.
Uintah County, 2003 UT App. 383, f 6, 81 P.3d 761.
2.

Issue No. 2 requires the review of the Trial Court's denial of what in

substance was a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The ruling is reviewed for
correctness. Mountain America Credit Union v. McClellan, 854 P.2d 590, 591 (Utah
App. 1993); see Houghton v. Department of Health, 2002 UT 101, % 7; 57 P.3d 1067.
3.

Issue No. 3 arises in the appeal and does not require a review of the Trial

4.

Issue No. 4 is reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard resolving all

Court.

disputes and evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict. Water & Energy Systems
Technology, Inc. v. Keil, 2002 UT 32, f 2; 48 P.3d 888; Chapman v. Uintah County, 2003
UT App. 3831f 8,81 P.3d 761.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5, in pertinent part:
(3) The Court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new
orders .. . and for distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is
reasonable and necessary.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-1, in pertinent part:
(l)(a) Except as otherwise provided by statute, punitive damages may be awarded
only if compensatory or general damages are awarded and it is established by clear
an convincing evidence that the acts or omissions of the tortfeasor are the result of
willful and malicious or intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests
a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of
others.
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
L

NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND
DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW.
Plaintiff, Elizabeth Mueller and Defendant David Allen purchased and took title to

their marital home as joint tenants each holding an undivided one-half interest. They later
divorced and their divorce decree ordered that the home be sold with the sales proceeds
remaining after payment of indebtedness against the home divided equally between them.
Some four months after the divorce, David Allen and his mother, Defendant Susan Allen
("Aliens"), without the knowledge or consent of Elizabeth Mueller, gave Defendants,
Randy McCandless and Halene McCandless ("McCandlesses") possession of the home
intending that McCandless would eventually purchase the home with a loan of
approximately 100% of the purchase price. McCandlesses delivered to Susan Allen an
amount which Susan Allen and David Allen had agreed would constitute one month
rental. During the next four months, McCandless occupied the home, were denied all
applications which they made to secure a loan to purchase the home, paid no further
rental and no amount was paid to our received by Elizabeth Mueller.
At the end of the four months time, Elizabeth Mueller gave written demand to the
Aliens and to McCandlesses that they advise what rental had been collected from
McCandless and that McCandless vacate the property unless the rental was current.
McCandless refused to respond or vacate and the Aliens refused to request them to do so.
McCandlesses also refused to either pay the delinquent rental or vacate the property as
directed by a written notice to pay or vacate given by Elizabeth Mueller. David Allen
then collected an additional two months rent from McCandless and again paid no portion
of that to Elizabeth Mueller.

3

On September 26, 2002, this action was commenced claiming against David Allen
and Susan Allen for tortuous interference with Elizabeth Mueller's right to the use and
occupancy of the home and the right to receive income therefrom, against the Aliens and
McCandlesses for trespass against Elizabeth Mueller's right, coequal with that of David
Allen, to the use and occupancy of the home and for unlawful detainer by McCandlesses.
Compensatory Damages were requested against all Defendants and punitive damages
against Aliens. David Allen and Susan Allen each counterclaimed and requested that the
action be tried to a jury.
David Allen and Susan Allen on February 3, 2004, filed a Motion For Judgment
On The Pleadings, Or For Partial Dismissal Or For Partial Judgment (R. 131-132).
Aliens argued that the court in the Elizabeth Mueller and David Allen divorce action had
continuing and exclusive jurisdiction over Elizabeth Mueller's claims against David Allen
as pertaining to what had been their marital home and that such collaterally estopped the
claims in this action and that the divorce decree constituted res judicata on Plaintiffs
claims against the Aliens. The court on May 20, 2003, ruled that Section 30-3-5, Utah
Code Ann. does not require that Elizabeth Mueller's claims against David Allen be raised
only in the prior divorce action. The Court held that the divorce court did not have
exclusive jurisdiction because (1) the claims are based upon circumstances and events
arising after the entry of the decree of divorce, (2) the claims are new claims not before
the court in the divorce action and seek relief in tort, (3) the claims involved not only
David Allen but other Defendants joined in the action who were not parties to the divorce
action and (4) the claims neither seek nor require the modification of the decree of
divorce. (R. 178-179).

4

On January 27, 28, 29 and 30, 2004, the case was tried to the Honorable Glenn K.
Iwasaki sitting with a jury. Randy McCandless and Halene McCandless were before the
trial court pro se. After the first day of trial, David Allen withdrew his counterclaim.
Upon the completion of the evidence, David Allen and Susan Allen renewed their motion
that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The court again denied the motion for the
reasons given in its order of May 20, 2003 (R. 516-517). The jury submitted its verdict on
January 30, 2004, therein finding that both David Allen and Susan Allen intentionally
interfered with Elizabeth Mueller's economic relations regarding the property and had
trespassed against Ms. Mueller's right to possession by causing Randy McCandless and
Halene McCandless to take possession. The jury found that Elizabeth Mueller had
sustained damages. The jury further found that both Randy McCandless and Halene
McCandless had trespassed against Elizabeth Mueller's right to possession of the
property, that they had become unlawful detainers of the property and that Elizabeth
Mueller had consequently sustained damages. The jury found against Susan Allen on her
counterclaim and found that Elizabeth Mueller should be awarded punitive damages
against both David Allen and Susan Allen (R. 508-512).
The Special Verdict Of The Jury On Punitive Damages awarded punitive damages
of $5,000.00 against David Allen and $30,000.00 against Susan Allen (R. 513).
Judgment On Special Verdict was entered February 27, 2004, awarding judgment for
Elizabeth Mueller and against each of the four Defendants. Judgment was entered inter
alia for (1) compensatory damages of $8,100.00 against David Allen, (2) compensatory
damages of $10,000.00 against David Allen and Susan Allen jointly and severally, (3)
punitive damages of $5,000.00 against David Allen and (4) punitive damages of
$30,000.00 against Susan Allen. (R. 516-518).
5

II.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
1.

Elizabeth Mueller and David Allen married in November 1998, separated

on August 19, 2001, and then divorced, with their divorce becoming final on January 22,
2002 (R. 577:20-21). Elizabeth Mueller was 19 years old at the time of her marriage
(R. 578:98). They had purchased their home ("The Home"), approximately a year after
their marriage, taking title as co-owners, each holding an undivided one-half interest. The
Home is the property subject of this action (R. 577:21-22; 578:99, 101). The Home was
on approximately one acre of property and was a "fixer upper" requiring roof and other
repair (R. 577:59; 579:481, 488). During their marriage they had placed a first and a
second mortgage against The Home (R. 577:22). Their divorce decree required that The
Home be sold as soon as reasonably practicable and any proceeds of sale remaining, after
the payment of mortgages, liens and expenses of sale, be divided equally between them
(Exh. 21).
2.

Susan Allen is the mother of David Allen and has been a Utah licensed real

estate sales agent for about the past 14 years (R. 578:299-300). She was familiar with
The Home as being the real estate agent that originally found The Home for
Elizabeth Mueller and David Allen (R. 578:101). Consequently, Elizabeth Mueller and
David Allen requested Susan Allen to serve as their real estate sales agent in attempting
to secure a buyer for The Home (R. 577:23). Susan Allen had them sign two separate
listing agreements which she prepared and whereby her services were retained. The first
listing agreement was signed April 10, 2001, before Elizabeth Mueller and David Allen
had separated. It expired September 9, 2001 (R. 578:102; Exh. 1). No buyer was secured
and a second listing agreement was prepared and signed, which expired on March 22,
2002 (R. 577:27-28; Exh. 2). Both listing agreements provided that The Home was not
6

available to rent (R. 577:24-29; Exh. 1 and 2). Elizabeth Mueller did not want the
property rented to a tenant because it was her understanding that such would hinder the
sale of the property and make it more difficult to show to prospective buyers and to have
it available for occupancy by a buyer (R: 577:26, 28-29).
3.

Susan Allen showed The Home to Halene McCandless and

Randy McCandless in early March 2002, who inspected the property and decided to offer
to purchase it at a price of $152,000.00, which they determined reflected the current state
of repair of The Home, including the disrepair of the roof(R. 578:172-173, 180). Over
the preceding one to two years, McCandlesses had rented because their previous home
had been lost to foreclosure (R. 578:170-172, 175). They had three horses, a goat and
two dogs which they intended to move into the property once purchased (R. 578:174).
4.

On March 2, 2002, Susan Allen prepared a written offer for McCandlesses

to purchase The Home (Exh. 3; R. 577:32; 578:305). At the time they signed their offer,
McCandlesses did not have any money to buy The Home, their credit was poor from their
prior foreclosure and they did not have the financial resources with which to make any
kind of down payment on the property and, consequently, needed 100% financing to
purchase (R. 578:174-176). Their offer was conditional upon a loan for the entire
purchase price (Exh. 3). Elizabeth Mueller knew nothing of McCandlesses other than
that they were interested in buying The Home. Susan Allen had not told her anything
with regard to their financial resources or their ability to purchase The Home (R. 577:31).
5.

When Susan Allen prepared McCandlesses' offer, she also obtained the

signature of McCandlesses on a written retention agreement whereby they retained
Susan Allen as their real estate agent and agreed to pay her, pursuant to that retention, a
real estate commission equal to 6% of the price for the acquisition of the property
7

(Exh. 14; R. 578:187-188). At the time, Susan Allen's second listing and agency

R. 577:27-28). The existence of McCandlesses agreement retaining Susan Allen as their

(R. 5^7:33).
.6. .

•;
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the McCandlesses' written offer of purchase (R. 577:29-30). At the time,
Eliza! - ^ M

*
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* :-r- r

and dryer in The Home to the McCandlesses if the McCandlesses then obtained their loan
to purchase the property (R 573:119) !\ s of that time. pa) ments had not been made on •'.'
the two mortgage loans against The Home for some three months and Elizabeth Mueller
was concerned that there needed to be some income from the property to make the " '•••
payments. Consequently, on that occasion of March 5, 2002, she asked Susan Allen

rental for payment on the loans awaiting sale (R. 577:38, 40-41; 578:302-304). Ms. Allen
said tl lat she w ouldnot so recommend (R 5 78:302 304; 5 1 9:355).
7.

•-•'- •: '••>'.••'•'• : -^-'-

When Susan Allen had assisted Elizabeth Mueller and David Allen in

original!:)/ b u> ing I he I lome, it \ \ as ob < loiis to all : f them that it vv as a proper ty that
needed a lot of repairs (R. 579:377-443, 481, 488). When Susan Allen wrote the

$152,000.00 purchase price would reflect the then fair market value of the property,
taking into account all the repairs that \ v ere required (R 5 '/ 9:443), In preparing u , , . ,:.
Susan Allen knew that McCandlesses would not be required to purchase the property
unless they obtained ^ i u*y o financing loan and she prepared the offer to make it
8'.'.

conditional upon their obtaining such loan approval by FHA (R. 578:308-310; Exh. 3).
However, she knew that FHA would not approve the loan because of the condition of the
roof and that if McCandlesses did not qualify for the loan, they would not be required to
purchase the property (R. 578:308-311; 579:357, 376). Susan Allen did not tell
McCandlesses that she believed the loan would not be approved (R. 579:376).
McCandlesses were, in fact, denied their loan and so advised Susan Allen (R. 578:176).
Sometime later in March 2002, Susan Allen advised Elizabeth Mueller that the
McCandlesses' loan application had been denied (R. 577:42).
8.

McCandlesses then determined to rent a property in West Valley City with

an option to buy, but the day before they were supposed to sign on that property,
Susan Allen telephoned and said she had found another lender who had pretty much
guaranteed them a loan for The Home. Susan Allen then offered to give them tenancy of
The Home (R. 578:176-178). Susan Allen told Mrs. McCandless that David Allen and
Elizabeth Mueller would rent The Home to the McCandlesses until their loan would go
through on the house so that they could buy it (R. 578:178). Susan Allen had previously
told McCandless that The Home was owned by Elizabeth Mueller and David Allen and
Mrs. McCandless understood that each of them owned an undivided one-half interest
(R. 578:178). Now, knowing that the McCandlesses had credit problems which would
predictably complicate or prevent their obtaining the 100% loan financing required for
their purchase of The Home, Susan Allen undertook to attempt to find McCandlesses
what Ms. Allen characterizes as a "B Loan," such being a loan for people having trouble
with credit arising from a low credit score, a foreclosure or other credit difficulties
(R. 578:310-311).
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9.

On April 5, 2002, Susan Allen told McCandlesses to move into the

property, and they did so along with their daughter, grandson, daughter's furuv -MM)
dogs, three horses and a goat (R. 578:169, 174, 206-207, 216-217, 3 1 . .
Elizabeth Mueller had never authorized ^usp.n Mbr

- 'VM-

I

--w^-w-rw

(R. 578:304; 579:444). McCandlesses had no communication of any kind with
Elizabeth M i - n -

:

- - r - - ,.- -

.* Vb

,, • .,,* i( ,

(R. 5^8:174). McCandlesses believed from their conversation with Susan Allen that they

< )n said April 5, 2002, Susan Allen filled out a form Residential Rental
Agrci ^ont *••' ^.T

* •'•• M-* : • lh ---- m - .l-,-^* * . •• • w.«"-) :.;

providing for a 30-day tenancy, with arental of $1,400.00 (Exh. 4; R. 577:43-45;
578:316, 318, 332-333)

*

* -

- \ ; v : . rer

:

'•• v. •

• * .. : , ^ _ agree- = -r

(R. 578:318). She did not tell the McCandlesses that if they did not get a loan to purchase
The I lome, that the> vv ould has e to "'^ acate (R 578:31

. i.

,;.b .,< . • nca HA; IU1

real estate listing with either Elizabeth Mueller or David Allen (R. 578:335; 579:444).
There w a s no loan application for 1\ 1 sCandlesses then pending (R 5' 78:188-1S*)).

: .••, •'

Susan Allen testified that as a realtor, she typically did not recommend that a seller place
a,-

• -v^cv\c

Hr ,

>:\ ;

••.- ./j u i \ : L -

.

* ,.

V,L c; : *': ,;i ns»c

(R. 578:301-302).

and of the proposed Residential Rental Agreement when Susan Allen telephoned her on

579:375). Susan Allen left a request on Elizabeth Mueller's voice mail that the telephone
call be re turned (R 5' 79:3 75) Elizabeth A lueller ret in ned the call and at the suggest
10

?

her father recorded the telephone conversation (R. 577:45-46). The audiotape recording
was received as Trial Exhibit 19. In the conversation, Susan Allen advised that she
already had the McCandlesses in The Home; they and David Allen had signed a rental
agreement and that Elizabeth's signature was needed; McCandlesses were still trying to
get their loan; she had known the McCandlesses' prior application for a FHA loan would
not work and had told them so; the rental arrangement was only for 30 days; the
McCandlesses were at the time seeking a loan through a loan broker specializing in
B loans and who expected such a loan would be closed within two weeks; the rental was
$1,400.00 a month being paid to David Allen and Elizabeth Mueller; the McCandlesses
were moving in with one little boy and two dogs; there was no security deposit or last
month's rental because the rental agreement was only for an interim period until the loan
was completed; the McCandlesses were having the utilities put in their own name;
McCandlesses were currently moving boxes into The Home; Elizabeth Mueller could go
and kick the McCandlesses out if she did not want them, and that if she so requested, that
Susan Allen would go and kick them out right then; and that there was no guarantee that
there would not be more surprises and if there were any changes, Susan Allen would
"probably" notify Elizabeth Mueller (Exh. 19; R. 577:49).
12.

Approximately one hour following the telephone conversation, Susan Allen

telefaxed the residential rental agreement to Elizabeth Mueller (R. 577:46).
Elizabeth Mueller was not agreeable to having the McCandlesses in the property and did
not sign the rental agreement (R. 577:46, 49). Along with the April 5, 2002 residential
rental agreement, Susan Allen also had prepared a form bill of sale, naming
Elizabeth Mueller as seller and Halene McCandless as buyer, and therein providing for
the sale to Ms. McCandless of a washer and dryer owned by Elizabeth Mueller (R.
11

579:356; Exh. 5). Susan Allen then signed the document, purportedly for Elizabeth

the bill of sale until after the filing of this action (R. 577:52-53).

(R. 578:188; 577:43-44). Randy McCandless never did sign the agreement (R. 578:191).

exclusive occupancy of The Home and that only they and their family would occupy it (R.

which to purchase the property, that they would have to vacate at the end of the 30 days

Dn the same evening of April 5, 2002, Elizabeth Mueller, accompanied by a
] l i e ; a.

• v."..;

'

"

-

. .

• .

v „;•-;.

- ,i- J ^ . C : : : : I . . C ILL . ;

understanding of the rental agreement (R. 577:50 V She there spoke with

and would not sign the rental agreement (R. 577:50-51; 578:130-131). She then
contacted two real estate agents, u\c oiivim's department and an attorney to determine her
legal rights with regard to the McCandlesses' occupancy of The Home and consequently
believed that there was not anything she com.- .:

- using an attorney and that she '

could not alone demand the McCandlesses to leave The Home (R. 578:91-93). She did
n O . .;.,:v Ulu .\1-Jk. UliQiCb^Cb U' ;>_.. * „ I _ : . O j . . . L '

i _ vi - v .

-

.L

.... - U. 1 ^UiilL-IIi^ HUH : H ,

did not have the right to do so (R. 578:93, 133). She believed that because she and
David Allen were co-owners of the property, that she did not have the right, alone, to
evict the McCandlesses from The Home (R. 578:133-134). She did not then declare to
Susan Allen or David Allen she wanted mo AicLandlesses to move out of the property,
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nor did she request that Susan Allen move them out of the property. She did not feel that
it would go anywhere for her to do that (R. 578:132-133).
15.

On the day the McCandlesses took possession of The Home, Susan Allen

told Elizabeth Mueller that one, Rick Curtis, was the loan broker who she had working on
a proposed B loan for McCandlesses (R. 577:61; Exh. 19; R. 577:49). Before the
McCandless transaction, Susan Allen had not had any dealings with Rick Curtis
(R. 578:320). On April 26, 2002, some three weeks after Susan Allen and David Allen
had delivered possession of The Home to the McCandlesses, Elizabeth Mueller received
from Rick Curtis a real estate purchase contract prepared by Susan Allen and signed by
the McCandlesses (R. 577:61-63). The earlier purchase contract had, by its terms,
terminated when the property was not sold by March 27, 2002 (Exh. 3). The new
purchase contract provided for a new purchase price of $160,000.00, with the provision
that the sellers, Elizabeth Mueller and David Allen, would pay up to 6% of the purchase
price in closing costs for the McCandlesses (Exh. 6; R. 577:64). A 6% reduction in the
price reflected an actual purchase price of $150,400.00, or some $1,600.00 less than the
price as had been provided in the March 5, 2002 purchase contract. Consequently, any
sale to McCandlesses was still dependent on their obtaining a 100% financing loan {see
Exh. 6).
16.

The April 26th purchase contract as prepared by Susan Allen provided that

McCandlesses' purchase of the property was conditional upon their getting the requisite
100% financing loan (R. 577:63-64; Exh. 6). Elizabeth Mueller signed and returned the
document to Rick Curtis because the sale of the property was her ultimate goal and he, in
submitting the document, told her that the McCandlesses5 loan had been approved
(R. 577:62-63). Thereafter, David Allen executed the agreement (R. 577:62-63). The
13

contract provided for a settlement deadline of May 2, 2002 (R. 577:65; Exh. 6). At the
time of the submission of the April 26, 2002 purchase contract. t!u M^Cnndlosso J ,
know of any improvement or change in their credit reputation or credit standing that had

that there had been any such change or improvement (R. 578:200-201). Approximately 4

so they still did not have any loan approval (R. 578:201). Notice of the loan denial was

McCandlesses continued to retain possession of The Home (R. 578:202-203).

occupancy of The Home was the April 5 rental payment paid by McCandlesses to
Susan Allen No payments had been made on the t \ vo n i

. , r - aga>nst the

property for the months of January through April 2002 (R. 577:38). At the end of April,
kh/a .-!
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\ lien spoke by telephone \:v ith the lender's representative
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and were then told that a payment of $550.00 should be paid to the lender to defer

requested and Susan Allen agreed to pay that amount from the $1,400.00 rental that Susan
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$275.00, was taken from the one-half of the rental payment to which Elizabeth Mueller

payment, Elizabeth Mueller has not received any rent from The Home nor any offer from
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18.

Susan Allen testified that on May 3, 2003, Elizabeth Mueller telephoned

and left word on her telephone voice mail saying that she wanted to get together and evict
the McCandlesses (R. 579:371).
19.

A notice of default dated July 30, 2002, was taped to the door of The Home

declaring that one of the mortgage loans against The Home was in default for failure to
pay monthly payments totaling $5,686.49. The McCandlesses then knew that the
property was in foreclosure (R. 578:207; Exh. 7).
20.

On August 5, 2002, Elizabeth Mueller's attorney of record wrote a letter in

her behalf to Susan Allen, David Allen and Coldwell Banker Premium Realty (R. 577:7475; Exh. 10). As of the time of the letter, Elizabeth Mueller did not know whether any
rental had been collected from the McCandlesses other than the original April payment
(R. 577:75). She did not receive any response to the letter from David Allen or
Susan Allen, has never received any offer from them to pay to her any amount of rental,
and neither of them have ever told her that they were willing to help her evict the
McCandlesses (R. 577:75-76). Notwithstanding, both Susan Allen and David Allen
received the letter and understood that they were there requested to advise whether any
rental had been paid by McCandlesses (R. 578:331; 579:508). David Allen understood
that, by the letter, he was being requested to either collect the rent or evict the
McCandlesses from The Home (R. 579:508-509). Susan Allen understood that the letter
requested David Allen to join with Elizabeth Mueller in order to evict the McCandlesses
from the property (R. 578:341). However, David Allen had told her that he did not want
to evict McCandlesses and she did not suggest that he do so (R. 578:341-342).
Susan Allen had not received rental payments other than the one of April 5, 2004,
understood from the letter that Elizabeth Mueller did not know whether rental payments
15

had been paid during the preceding four months, did not believe that David Allen had

(R. 578:331-332).
'iiii^iiii \llen llu'n 1snr*\ that fir Mel

.UUIICSSL".

were still ucnipsin^

•

property, did not contact them about their delinquent rental payments and did not feel it

rental was delinquent because she believed the rental agreement was only between the

great, if it went to foreclosure, so be it" (R. 578:327). David Allen's testimony was that
liL-v-i . : • • . VIIL \*.;: . . .\;
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: that he just w anted the property

to be out of his hair (R. 579:509-510). He testified that he would never have evicted the
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V :io lime while the McCandlesses were in possession of The Home did Susan Allen or
* •» .,* Aiuii show ' I he Home to an> other prospective buyer or tenant • -A. * .v.^*>;
579:509). Susan Allen knew that the property was in foreclosure but testified that she did
not rcLdh wneiner si^ iviiew so at tn. uinc u: me A * ^ . ^ :

- .juei iroin Elizabeth

Mueller's attorney and did not recall from whom she learned of the pending foreclosure
(R. 5 78:335-33 7).
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On August 5, 2002, Elizabeth Mueller's attorney also wrote a letter to

McCandlesses (R. 5 78:221; Exh, 9) Mrs. McCandless reu-. .aid understood the letter and
that it was requesting the McCandlesses to advise within seven days whether they were
current on past rental payments, whether they would voluntarily vacate The Home and
whether they would permit it to be inspected (R. 578:221-223). Susan Allen received a
copy of the letter and knew it reflected a concern regarding the unpaid rental (R.
16

578:330). Although they had not paid any rental for the months of May through August,
McCandlesses did not respond to the letter and had no intention of vacating the property
(R. 578:222-223). However, and in any event, as of the time of their receipt of the letter,
they could not pay the delinquent rental (R. 578:224). Mrs. McCandless testified that she
talked to Susan Allen about the fact that the rental payments had not been made
(R. 578:224). She testified that if either Susan or David Allen had told she and her
husband to move out of the property that they would have done so (R. 578:232-233).
23.

Approximately two months after McCandlesses had taken possession of

The Home, Elizabeth Mueller went back over to The Home to inspect it and see how it
was being maintained. Halene McCandless did not permit her in The Home but referred
her to Susan Allen for all information regarding the property (R. 577:59-60; 578:140).
When Elizabeth Mueller asked Halene McCandless about whether the McCandlesses
were paying rent, Ms. McCandless told her to talk with Susan Allen (R. 578:220-221).
However, in the telephone conversation at the end of April 2002, between Ms. Mueller,
Susan Allen and the representative of the lender holding the mortgage loans against The
Home, Susan Allen told Ms. Mueller that she did want to talk to her anymore and in fact
would not do so (R. 577:67; 578:139-140). Consequently, Ms. Mueller did not further
talk to Susan Allen, and understanding that David Allen was out of the state and would
not assist her with regard to the McCandless issue, did not try to contact him (R. 578:139140). Again, however, Susan Allen testified that on May 3, 2002, Elizabeth Mueller had
telephoned and left word on her voice mail asking that they get together to evict the
McCandlesses from the Home (R. 579:371).
24.

On August 23, 2002, Elizabeth Mueller caused there to be served on the

McCandlesses a written Notice To Pay Delinquent Rental Or Quit Possession. They did
17

not pay any of the delinquent rental (R. 578:225-227; Exh. 15). McCandlesses were then
dealing only with Susan Allen and David Allen and r .
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communication with Elizabeth Mueller (R. 578:228). Upon receiving the notice, Halene
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time (R. 578:343).

Mueller's attorney and the August 23, 2002 Notice To Pay Delinquent Rental Or Quit

and so advised Susan Allen of his intention (R. 578:341-342). I his was after August 26,
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(R. 578:343). Although McCandlesses had made the $1,400.00 rental payment to Susan
Allen on April 5, 2002 the) had not made payments * *••.
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and August (R. 578:202-203). David Allen did not tell Susan Allen why he was going to

going to do with the rent or whether he would give any part to Elizabeth Mueller (R.
578:3 %7) After the real estate purchase agreement of Apr II 26 2002, SN hich Susan Allen
prepared and had the McCandlesses sign, she had not given McCandlesses any other

loan for that purpose (R. 578:230-231). Elizabeth Mueller did not attempt to find a

by both she and David Allen as the owners of the property (R. 579:524).
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26.

On Sdptember 4, 2002, David Allen requested and McCandlesses paid him

additional rental of $2,800.00, which was all the money they then had (R.578:234-235).
Mrs. McCandless did not believe that it was any of her business to inquire what David
Allen was going to do with the money and she neither asked him nor did he tell her (R.
578:235). Although, Mrs. McCandless understood that Elizabeth Mueller owned a onehalf interest in the property, she understood that the rental being paid was for all of the
interest in the property because of her belief that no one else other than she and her family
had any right to occupy the property (R. 578:235-236, 238).
27.

On September 26, 2002, this action was filed and Susan and David Allen

were served with summons on September 29, 2002 (R. 1 and 51-53). McCandlesses were
served on October 2nd (R. 578:54-56, 241). Approximately two months later, November
29th, David Allen requested from McCandlesses and they then paid to him an additional
$1,400.00 (R. 578:239-240). David Allen had told Susan Allen that he was going back
and try to collect additional rental from McCandlesses (R. 578:344). She never asked and
he never advised how much he intended to collect or what he would do with the amount
so collected (R. 578:344-345). Again, McCandlesses did not inquire what he was going to
do with the $1,400.00 or whether he was going to pay any of it to Elizabeth Mueller and
he did not so advise them (R. 578:240). However, as a consequence of the filing of the
court action, McCandlesses understood that the lawsuit claimed that they should not be
occupying The Home and that they owed back rent to Elizabeth Mueller (R. 578:241242). David Allen testified that of the $2,800.00 rental he collected in September 2002,
and the $ 1,400.00 collected in November 2002, he did not pay any portion to Elizabeth
Mueller nor apply any portion to the mortgages against The Home (R. 579:512).

19

28

David Allen prepared a real estate purchase contract which was signed by

he and the McCandlesses on Decembt--'-
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property to McCandlesses at a sales price of $169,700.00 (R. 579:501; 578:246; Exh. 20).
Halene McCandless testified that shr hHir\.\] riru R-.-K < .• *>> detenvine- »h<*
$169,700.00 price (R. 578:248). However, contrary to what Aliens represent at page 28

the "total arrangement'*, iror the purposes of mitigating Plaintiffs damages and pursuant
to that certain Amendment To Agreement \ nd Stipulation Of Plaintiff And Allen
Defendants, Elizabeth Mueller executed and caused to be delivered to David Allen her

16, 2002, David Allen sold and conveyed title to the McCandlesses pursuant to their
December 2002, c •< >n1 in u ;t (R 578:24- k; 579:492 493)

^ lth- • igh the i:ie\\ contract sales

price was $169,700.00, McCandlesses understood that they were only paying the

increased price was only to facilitate their getting a loan to purchase the property (R.
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purchase of The Home (R. 578:249).
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agreement and which McCandlesses understood she waived so that they could purchase
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obtained by the McCandlesses was only $152,000.00 and some odd dollars which the
lender had approved as a 90% loan to value, that being that the lender would loan 90% of
the value of the property and require that the sellers then finance 5% of the remaining
purchase price and the buyer obtain a gift from another source equivalent to the remaining
5% of the value (R. 578:346-348). The loan amount was $152,730.00 (Exh. 11; R.
578:252). Neither Aliens nor McCandlesses contended or proffered evidence that the
actual value of the property was in excess of that amount.
30.

In accordance with the parties Amendment to Agreement and Stipulation of

Plaintiff and Allen Defendants, dated December 20, 2002, Susan Allen negotiated with
the lender holding the two mortgage loans against The Home for the lender to accept
$140,000.00 as the total payoff of the mortgage loans and to which involvement by Susan
Allen, Elizabeth Mueller agreed for the purpose of attempting to mitigate the amount of
damages which she claimed against Aliens (R. 122-128; 578:155-156).
31.

To assure that the McCandlesses loan would close, David Allen provided

fictitious financing in an amount of $8,485.00 which was characterized as a "seller carry
back" requiring monthly installment payments by McCandlesses of $62.25, and with
regard to which McCandlesses executed a promissory note in that amount and a trust deed
against The Home purportedly to secure payment (Exh. 11; R. 578:252-256, 347-348;
Exh. 17; Exh. 18). Notwithstanding the giving of the promissory note and trust deed to
David Allen, McCandlesses did not understand that they owed any money to David Allen,
but only that the two documents had been executed so that they could obtain their loan for
the purchase of The Home (R. 578:253-255). Halene McCandless testified that David
Allen told her at or sometime after the closing that there was not anything owing by them
to him (R. 578:255). In signing the trust deed to David Allen, McCandlesses did not
21

understand that it was given to secure payment of the promissory note to David Allen (R.
578:257). McCandlesses have never made any payments on the promissory note nor has
David Allen or Susan Allen asked them to do so (R. 578:259-260). Interestingly, David
Allen testified that he was owed the $8,485.00 under the promissory note and that he
considered the trust deed to be a second mortgage or second loan against The Home (R.
579:497-499), but then acknowledged that in his prior deposition testimony he had
testified that he did not believe that Mr. and Mrs. McCandless owed him any money (R.
579:499-500). He admitted that the McCandlesses have not made any payment under the
promissory note (R. 579:500-501).
32.

The escrow closing of McCandlesses purchase of The Home required them

to pay an amount of $14,108.19 and provided sales proceeds of $17,409.64 to David
Allen (Exh. 11; R. 579:493). However, McCandlesses did not have the money required
of them and consequently Susan Allen and David Allen determined to provide the money
through a company owned by Ms. Allen's husband, he being David's father (R. 579:430,
493, 502). David Allen understood that there was no way that the McCandlesses could
buy the property without Susan Allen providing $14,100.00 at the time of closing (R.
579:502-503).
33.

The morning of the real estate closing, Halene McCandless received a

telephone call from Susan Allen saying that they needed to meet at Wells Fargo Bank,
where McCandlesses were then banking, and where Susan Allen would deliver to them a
check for them to change into a cashier's check. This was the first that McCandlesses
knew that they needed to come up with $14,108.19 to close the purchase of the property
and that Susan Allen was providing money for that purpose (R. 578:266-267). That same
morning Susan Allen met McCandlesses at the bank with a check for $14,100.00 made
22

payable to Randy MbCandless, written on the account MCA Construction, Inc. and signed
by Susan Allen (R. 578:261-262, Exh. 16; R. 579:430-431). Susan Allen testified that
she gave the $14,100.00 to the McCandlesses in order to make the sale go through (R.
579:431). Susan Allen and Randy McCandless took the check into the bank, deposited it
and obtained a cashier's check in the same amount and took that to the real estate closing
(R. 578:262-263).
34.

The $14,100.00 which Susan Allen advanced, was to cause the purchase of

the property to close and the lender to make the loan. Approximately the next day, David
Allen repaid the amount to his father and Susan Allen from the $17,409.64 which he took
from the closing as the seller's net proceeds of sale (R. 579:436, 494). The net result was
a reduction in the sales price of the property by an amount of $14,100.00. There is no
evidence that the McCandlesses paid any money to obtain their loan and to purchase The
Home. Rather, all evidence was they did not have the financial resources to buy the
property, ultimately did purchase it only with a 100% loan and which was made only as a
consequence of David Allen's fictitious seller carry back and Susan Allen's one day cash
advance all designed to give the appearance of a buyer having a 10% investment or equity
position in the property to prompt the lender to make a loan which had already been
rejected on three previous occasions. Elizabeth Mueller did not receive any money from
the transaction (R. 577:76).
3 5.

Elizabeth Mueller presented evidence regarding her claims for

compensatory damages. Exh. 12 was illustrative of the amount of her claims against
Aliens. She claims entitlement to one-half of the $1,400.00 rental for each month of the
period of April 5, 2002 to and including the sale of the property on December 15, 2002
less the $275.00 whicph had been applied in her behalf from the April 5, 2002 rental.
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Additionally, she claims one-half of the equity from the sale of the property. $5,581.00
represents one-half of the total rental value, and $12,947.00 one-half of the equity from
the sale of the property and which amounts total $18,528.00 (Exh. 12; R. 577:77-78;
578:144-147, 156). The jury's verdict awarded compensatory damages of $8,100.00
against David Allen and $10,000.00 against the Aliens jointly and severally, for a total
compensatory damage award of $18,100.00 (R. 508-59).
36.

Evidence was presented on the issue of the amount of punitive damages to

be awarded against Susan Allen and David Allen. Such showed that Susan Allen had a
net worth of $490,000.00 and David Allen a negative net worth of $7,967.00, but that he
was currently employed at an hourly wage of $8.00 an hour (R. 580:555, 559-560). The
court awarded compensatory damages against David Allen of $8,100.00, and against
David Allen and Susan Allen, jointly and severally, of $10,000.00. Punitive damages
were awarded against David Allen and Susan Allen of $5,000.00 and $30,000.00,
respectively (R. 516-518).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The Court properly instructed the jury on the law of trespass. Aliens

contention as argued at Point I of their Brief that Elizabeth Mueller cannot recover
against Aliens for trespass as a matter of law, was contrary to Issue No. 2 of their
Statement Of Issues and not before the Trial Court by way of motion. The issue is
preserved only by way of Aliens objection to Jury Instruction No. 25. Aliens giving
McCandlesses sole and exclusive occupancy of The Home constituted a trespass against
Elizabeth Mueller's undivided one-half ownership interest and right to co-occupancy of
The Home for which she is entitled to recover in trespass as a matter of law.
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2.

Elizabeth Mueller's claims against the Defendants arose from Defendants'

actions occurring after her divorce from David Allen. The claims were never before the
divorce court, involved persons not parties to the divorce action and did not require the
modification of the divorce decree. Consequently, the divorce court did not have
exclusive jurisdiction of the claims and the divorce decree did not constitute res judicata
against the claims and the claims were not collaterally estopped.
3.

Aliens | have failed to properly marshal the evidence in support of the verdict

as a necessary prerequisite to their attack on the verdict. Consequently, this Court should
assume that the verdict is supported by the evidence.
4.

The evidence abundantly supports the verdict, including the award of

punitive damages against Susan Allen and David Allen who have failed to properly
marshal evidence in Support of their contention that the evidence was not sufficient.
ARGUMENT
I.

ELIZABETH MUELLER WAS ENTITLED, AS A MATTER OF LAW,
TO GO TO THE JURY ON HER CLAIMS FOR TRESPASS.

A.

Aliens have got correctly shown where the issue was preserved in the Trial
Court.
At No. 2 of their Statement Of The Issues, Aliens frame as their trespass issue,

whether the Trial Co^irt was in error in refusing, at the close of Plaintiffs' case, to grant
David Allen's motion for summary judgment upon the theory that he could not commit
trespass on the property nor could Susan Allen trespass if her conduct was with his
permission. However, there was no motion at any time before the Court directed at the
trespass issue.
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The only pretrial motion made by David Allen and Susan Allen was their January
31, 2003, Motion For Judgment On The Pleading, Or For Partial Dismissal Or For Partial
Judgment (R. 131-133). It did not address trespass, but only whether the Court in the
Elizabeth Mueller and David Allen divorce proceeding had exclusive jurisdiction of the
issues framed in this case. The Trial Court entered its order on May 20, 2003 denying the
motion (R. 178-179). Then, at completion of the presentation of evidence at trial, David
Allen again raised the same motion which once again, was not in any way directed at the
law of trespass (R. 579:528-530). The Court denied that motion for the same reasons
given in its earlier order of May 20, 2003 (R. 516-517; 579:531).
The Aliens did, after the presentation of the evidence, object to the form of the
special verdict of the jury and in particular paragraphs 3 and 4 addressing trespass and the
Court's Instruction No. 25 (R. 580:532-533). However, the Aliens had not submitted a
substitute instruction directed at trespass other than their proposed No. 28 which only
instructed that to prevail on her trespass claim, Elizabeth Mueller "must show by a
preponderance of the evidence, that Defendants David and Susan Allen entered upon or
remained upon the property without the privilege to do so" (R. 347).
B.

As a matter of law David Allen could and did trespass against the interest of
his cotenant Elizabeth Mueller.
David Allen and Susan Allen neither submitted to the Trial Court nor have here

given any authority for their position that because David Allen owned an undivided onehalf interest in the property, he and Susan Allen were entitled to place the McCandlesses
in possession of The Home and that such could not constitute a trespass against Elizabeth
Mueller's one-half interest in the property. However, their premise flies in the face of
Utah law.
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In Gillmor v. Gillmor, 694 P.2d 1037 (Utah 1984) the court was called upon to
address the rights of co-owners to a ranch property. The court determined:
A tenant in common has the right to use and occupy the entire property held
in cotenancy without liability to other cotenants. Each cotenant has the
right to "free and unobstructed possession . . . . "
However, a cotenant who ousts another cotenant or acts in such a fashion as
to necessarily exclude a fellow cotenant, violates the rights of that cotenant.
(Citing Utah Oil Refining Co. v. Leigh, 98 UT 149, 155, 96 P.2d 1100,
1102, 1103 (1939); Roberts v. Roberts, 584 P.2d 378, 380 (Utah 1978)).
Gillmor at 1040. Additionally, "[o]ne joint tenant or tenant in common cannot bind his
cotenant by a contract which he may make relating to the common property." Williams v.
Singleton, 723 P.2d 421, 423 (Utah 1986). Elizabeth Mueller and David Allen had the
right to co-possession of the property. However, David Allen testified that he delivered
to McCandlesses the sole and exclusive occupancy and possession of The Home (R.
579:512). Also, McCandlesses understood and intended that they were receiving
exclusive occupancy and possession (R. 578:235-236). Consequently, the court instructed
the jury as follows:
Inst. No. 21: It is undisputed and you are instructed as a matter of law
"that Elizabeth Mueller and David Allen were co-owners, each owning a
one-half interest in the property, and, on April 4, 2002, each was entitled to
possession to be shared with the other (R. 479).
Inst. No. 22: It is the law that one co-owner of property cannot bind
another co-owner to a contract regarding the property unless the other coowner agrees (R. 480).
Inst. No. 25: Elizabeth Mueller seeks to recover damages from all of the
defendants for a trespass to the property to the extent of her one-half
ownership interest in the property. A trespasser is one who intentionally
goes upon the land or premises of another without invitation, right or
consent, or causes another to do so. Trespass is the wrongful entry upon the
lands of another and an infringement on the right of possession of another
(R. 483).
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Inst. No. 26: To award Elizabeth Mueller damages against any one of the
Defendants for trespass against the property, you must find:
1.
That the particular defendant, be it David Allen, Susan Allen,
Randy McCandless and/or Halene McCandless, interfered with
Elizabeth Mueller's right to hold possession of the property, with
David Allen or some other person authorized by David Allen;
2.
That said defendant interfered with Elizabeth Mueller's right
to possession by entering or causing someone else to enter the
property and thereby deny Elizabeth Mueller her right to enjoy
possession;
3.
The particular defendant intended to perform the act that
resulted in unlawful invasion of Elizabeth Mueller's right to
possession of the property; and
4.
The particular defendant had no right to do the act that
constituted the unlawful invasion. (R. 484).
The Court correctly instructed the jury as a matter of law and no objection was
raised to any of the above instructions. The delivery of possession of The Home to the
McCandlesses was without Elizabeth Mueller's knowledge or authorization. She had
legal title to and a right to possession co-equal and together with that of David Allen.
Aliens provide no authority for their position.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT HAD SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OF ALL
OF THE ISSUES BEFORE IT
Aliens contend that the Elizabeth Mueller and David Allen divorce proceeding

vested in the divorce court exclusive jurisdiction to determine Elizabeth Mueller's claims
in this action and additionally, that the resulting decree of divorce constituted res judicata
and a collateral estoppel of the claims. Such premise was first addressed to the court by
Aliens joint pretrial motion of January 31, 2003 and which the Court denied by its May
20, 2003 Order (R. 131-142; 178-179). At the conclusion of evidence at trial, the motion
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was again raised and denied (R. 516-517; 579:528-531). Aliens did not submit judicial
precedent to support either motion.
Elizabeth Mueller's tort claims first arose some two and one-half months after
entry of the divorce decree. The claims were not only against David Allen, the party to
the divorce action, but also Susan Allen, Halene McCandless and Randy McCandless.
Additionally, Susan Allen and David Allen counterclaimed against Elizabeth Mueller for
defamation, abuse of process and intentional infliction of emotional distress (R. 61-72).
Susan Allen's claims were prosecuted to the completion of trial and David Allen's
through the first day of trial (R. 508-511, 516-517). All claims arose subsequent to the
divorce action, involved three defendants who were not parties to that action, addressed
claims and issues never having been before the divorce court including Aliens'
counterclaims and were claims and issues which the divorce court would not have
accepted if presented to it.
In denying the pretrial motion, the Court ruled that § 30-3-5 Utah Code Ann. does
not require the claims be raised in the divorce action because (1) they are based on
circumstances and events arising after the entry of the divorce decree; (2) they were new
claims not before the Court in the divorce action and seek relief in tort; (3) they involved
other defendants who were not parties to the divorce action; and (4) they neither seek nor
require the modification of the decree of divorce (R. 178-179). Based on the same
findings and reasoning, the Court denied the Allen motion as raised as the conclusion of
the presentation of tr^al evidence (R. 516-517; 579:528-531).
As the divorce court was not called upon to address the claims of these parties, the
divorce decree could Inot and did not constitute a final judgment on the merits of the
claims and neither constituted res judicata or a collateral estoppel of the claims.
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Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Company, 2003 UT 8, f 23, 70 P.3d 1. Consequently, the
issue is whether the divorce Court for some reason had exclusive jurisdiction to resolve
these claims. However, the pertinent part of § 30-3-5, Utah Code Ann. only provides:
(3) The Court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new
orders . . . and for distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is
reasonable and necessary.
Susan Allen and David Allen did not proffer any authority for their apparent
premise that the statute itself precluded jurisdiction of the Trial Court. However, the
divorce decree in relevant part only provided that the property be sold. Those claims did
not require any modification of the decree. Jurisdiction was properly in the Trial Court.
III.

APPELLANTS HAVE FAILED TO SUFFICIENTLY MARSHAL THE
EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE JURY'S VERDICT.
Aliens argue at Point III of their Brief that the verdict is not supported by the

evidence. However, they have not met their burden of marshaling the evidence
supporting the verdict for trespass and punitive damages. "A party challenging a fact
finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding." Rule
24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This Court has said:
The marshaling process is not unlike becoming the devil's advocate.
Counsel must extricate himself or herself from the client's shoes and fully
assume the adversary's position. In order to properly discharge the duty of
marshaling the evidence, the challenger must present, in comprehensive and
fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial
which supports the very findings the appellant resists. After constructing
this magnificent array of supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out
a fatal flaw in the evidence. The gravity of this flaw must be sufficient to
convince the appellate court that the [trial] court's finding resting upon the
evidence is clearly erroneous.
Neely v. Bennett, 2002 UT App. 189, f 11, 51 P.3d 724 quoting West Valley City v.
Majestic Investment Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Ut. Ct. App. 1991).
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(Emphasis added).
The following evidence has neither been acknowledged nor addressed by Aliens.
1.

In signing the rental agreement, David Allen intended that McCandlesses

would have sole and exclusive occupancy of The Home and that only they and their
family would occupy it (R. 579:512).
2.

Mrs. McCandlesses understood that in paying the $1,400.00 rent for the

property that she and Mr. McCandless were paying rent for all of the property, for all
interest in the property and that no one else had any right to come in and occupy part of
the property (R. 578:235-236).
3.

Susan Allen admitted that Elizabeth Mueller had never authorized her to put

a tenant in the propertv (R. 578:304; 579:444).
4.

Halenel McCandless testified that Susan Allen told her that Elizabeth

Mueller said it was alright for McCandlesses to rent the home (R. 578:181).
5.

Susan Allen admitted that in her prior deposition she had testified that as a

realtor, she typically did not recommend that a seller place a prospective buyer in a home
prior to closing, becatise such can place the seller at risk (R. 578:301-302).
6.

In preparing McCandlesses' March 5, 2002 offer to purchase The Home,

Susan Allen knew thkt FHA would not approve the loan because of the condition of the
roof, that if McCandlesses did not qualify for the loan they would not be required to
purchase the property, but did not tell McCandlesses that she did not believe the loan
would be approved (R. 578:308-310; 579:357, 376).
7.

When Susan and David Allen gave McCandlesses occupancy of The Home,

Susan Allen then knew that McCandlesses had credit problems and so she was trying to
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get them a "B loan" that being a loan for people having trouble with credit (R. 578:310-311).
8.

On April 26, 2002, Susan Allen prepared a second written offer from

McCandlesses to purchase The Home. McCandlesses did not then know of any
improvement or change in their credit reputation or credit standing that had occurred
since the date of their first loan denial and did not have any reason to believe that there
had been any such change or improvement (R. 578:200-201). Notwithstanding the offer
still provided that the McCandlesses needed a 100% financing loan (R. 577:61-63; Exh.6;
578:200-201).
9.

When David Allen and Susan Allen received the August 5, 2002 letter from

Elizabeth Mueller's attorney, they understood that the letter was requesting that they
either collect delinquent rental or evict the McCandlesses (R. 578:341; 579:508-509).
10.

Halene McCandless testified that after receiving on August 23, 2002,

Elizabeth Mueller's Notice To Pay Delinquent Rental Or Quit Possession, that she
telephoned either Susan or David Allen, she thinks it was Susan Allen, and she believes
she read the notice over the phone to that person (R. 578:228-230).
11.

On August 26, 2002, Susan and David Allen learned that the McCandlesses

had been denied a loan for the third time (R. 578:343).
12.

David Allen testified that he would never have evicted the McCandlesses

and would never have agreed to let anybody else evict them (R. 579:492).
13.

Susan Allen testified that David Allen indicated to her that if the property

"sold great, if it went to foreclosure, so be it" (R. 578:327).
14.

The $2,800.00 rent payment which McCandlesses paid in September 2002,

was paid by them to David Allen at which time he and Susan Allen were aware of
Plaintiffs August 23, 2002 Notice To Pay Delinquent Rent Or Quit Possession (R.
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578:226-230; 340-342). Before the $2,800.00 was collected Susan Allen had also learned
that McCandlesses had been denied a loan for the third time (R. 578:343).
15.

At the December 2002 purchase of the property, McCandlesses had no

money with which to pay the $14,108.19 required of them at closing and until the
morning of the closing, were not aware that they had to come up with any such money (R.
578:266-267; 579:502-503).
16.

Susan Allen and David Allen both knew that Susan Allen and her husband

had to advance $14,100.00 at the time of closing in order to make the sale go through (R.
579:431,502-503).
17.

David Allen first testified at trial that he was in fact owed the $8,485.00

under the promissory note and that he considered the trust deed to be a second mortgage
or second loan against The Home (R. 579:497-499). He then admitted on crossexamination that in his prior deposition he had testified that he did not believe that Mr.
and Mrs. McCandless owed him any money (R. 579:499-500). He testified that the
McCandlesses have not made any payment under the promissory note (R. 579:500-501).
18.

McCandlesses did not understand that the trust deed which they executed at

the escrow closing was to secure payment of the promissory note they had given to David
Allen (R. 578:257).
19.

Approximately the day following the escrow closing, David Allen repaid

the $14,100.00 to his father and Susan Allen from the amount which he took from the
escrow closing as seller's net proceeds of sale (R. 579:436, 494).
20.

McCandlesses have never made any payments on the promissory note nor

has David Allen or Susan Allen asked them to do so (R. 578:259-260).
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21.

Elizabeth Mueller did not receive any money from the escrow closing (R.

577:76).
The Aliens are required to marshal "every scrap" of evidence that may support the
verdict. Although their Statement Of The Facts identifies a substantial portion of the
evidence, Aliens do not acknowledge the evidence here numbered 1 through 21. Perhaps
more importantly, such acknowledgment still would not meet their marshaling
requirement.
If it is determined that the requirement to marshal has not been met, then this Court
assumes that the evidence supports the verdict. 438 Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004
UT 72, f 69; 99 P.3d 801. If Aliens by chance contend that any of the evidence was
irrelevant, then they have the burden of proving lack of relevancy. Harding v. Bell, 2002
Utah 108, If 21, 57 P.3d 1093. Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence". Rule 401, Utah Rules
of Evidence. The above evidence neither recognized nor addressed by Aliens does make
the findings of the jury more probable than they would have been absent that evidence.
The relevance of the evidence cannot be disputed.
In Neely v. Bennett, 2002 UT App. 189; 51 P.3d 724, this Court declared that a
voluminous recitation of evidence does not in of itself meet the marshaling requirement.
The Court said:
. . . an exhaustive or voluminous recitation of all the facts presented at trial,
even if this recitation includes within its body the facts that support the
challenged ruling, is not what is expected. The marshaled facts should
"correlate particular items of evidence with the challenged findings,"
supporting the findings with all available evidence in the record, and only
then should an appellant attempt to demonstrate how the challenged
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findings are clearly erroneous. (Citing West Valley City v. Majestic, Inv.
Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315).
The Court continue^:
Simply stated, we do not want an exhaustive review of all of the evidence
presented at trial. Rather, we want a precisely focused summary of all the
evidence that supports any finding that is challenged on the ground that it is
clearly erroneous.
Neely 2002 UT App. 189 at f 12 and FN 1.
(Emphasis added).
Point III of Aliens' argument fails the marshaling test because there is no attempt
made to correlate evidence with regard to any particular finding including that of punitive
damages and no attempt is made to demonstrate how or on what basis this Court, in
addressing a specific finding, can conclude that it is unsupported by the evidence. The
punitive damages award is all that they specifically address. They have not objected to
any damage instruction, but rather only argue that the evidence deduced in support of
punitive damages is not sufficient.
Aliens have failed to meet their obligation to marshal the evidence. Consequently,
they have failed to meet their burden on appeal and this Court should assume that the
evidence adequately supports the verdict. Shar's Cars, L.L.C. v. Elder, 2004 UT App.
258,131; 97 P.3d 724; Young v. Young, 1999 UT 38, If 30, 979 P.2d 338.
IV.

THE VERDICT IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND
ALLENS HAVE NOT DEMONSTRATED OTHERWISE.
David Allen and Susan Allen declare that "there is absolutely no factual basis for

the jury to have found any wrongdoing on the part of the Defendants Allen, whatsoever"
and "the evidence does not support the jury's findings in any regard". (Brief at 37).
However, they do not identify how the evidence is insufficient. Although No. 4 of their
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Statement Of The Issues seeks a review of the entire verdict with special emphasis on the
punitive damages award, Aliens do not address evidence directed at tortuous interference
and trespass and on which the jury awarded compensatory damages. Their argument is
directed exclusively at the award of punitive damage.
The verdict is for compensatory damages of $8,100.00 against David Allen on the
claim of tortuous interference, $10,000.00 against David Allen and Susan Allen jointly
and severally on the claim of trespass and for punitive damages of $5,000.00 against
David Allen and $30,000.00 against Susan Allen (R. 508-509, 513). Susan Allen testified
that she had a net worth of $490,000.00. Consequently, the punitive damage award
against her represents a single digit multiplier of three. David Allen testified that he had a
negative net worth of $7,967.00 but was currently employed at an hourly wage of $8.00
an hour. Punitive damages of $5,000.00 was awarded against him.
In relevant part, § 78-18-1, Utah Code Ann. 1953, provides:
(l)(a) Except as otherwise provided by statute, punitive damages maybe
awarded only if compensatory or general damages are awarded and it is
established by clear an convincing evidence that the acts or omissions of the
tortfeasor are the result of willful and malicious or intentionally fraudulent
conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless indifference
toward, and a disregard of, the rights of others.
The Court's Instruction No. 42 so instructed (R. 500). No objection was raised to
the instruction.
The Supreme Court of Utah has recognized that "except when they transgress due
process guarantees, punitive damages awards are properly the province of the states."
Campbell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 2004 UT 34, f 10; 98
P.3d 409, citing Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424,
433, 121 S.Ct. 1678, 149 L.Ed. 2d 674 (2001). Campbell was on remand from the United
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States Supreme Coutt in State Farm Mutual Automobile Company v. Campbell, 538 U.S.
408, 123 S.Ct. 1513, 155 L.Ed. 2d 585 (2003). Although in Campbell the Court reviewed
the punitive damage award through the three guide posts articulated in BMW of North
America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L.Ed. 2d 809 (1996) it
continues to apply the Utah standards which it identifies as the Crooks ton factors. In
Campbell, the Court said:
In Utah, punitive damages are analyzed under a seven-factor test commonly known
as the Crookston standards. The Crookston factors are: (i) the relative wealth of
the defendant; (ii) the nature of the alleged misconduct; (iii) the facts and
circumstances surrounding such conduct; (iv) the effect thereof on the lives of the
plaintiff and others; (v) the probability of future recurrence of the misconduct; (vi)
the relationship of the parties; and (vii) the amount of actual damages awarded.
Citing Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 808 (Utah 1991). Also
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937 (Utah 1993).
Campbell, 2004 UT M, f 20 at FN 3. No relative weights have been assigned to the
various factors. Crookston 860 P.2d at 808.
The evidence establishes that the conduct of David Allen and Susan Allen towards
Elizabeth Mueller was both willful and malicious, that it constituted an indifference
toward her and a disregard of her title and rights in The Home and which conduct was
both knowing and reckless. Aliens do not address the specific evidence and in essence
declare that the eventual sale of the property which relieved Elizabeth Mueller and David
Allen from their obligation for the mortgage loans, justified the means which the Aliens
undertook to accomplish that end. They suggest that because the end was eventually
achieved that any award of punitive damages, regardless of the amount, is
unconstitutional. However, such is a complete disregard of the clear and convincing
evidence presented to the jury.
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While The Home was still under a real estate agency agreement with Susan Allen,
she had McCandlesses execute a separate agreement agreeing to pay her a 3%
commission if they purchased the property. She prepared a written offer for their
purchase and obtained the acceptance of Elizabeth Mueller and David Allen. Although
Susan Allen had prepared the offer requiring 100% loan financing she then knew that the
condition of the roof would cause the loan to be rejected. It was rejected.
On April 5, 2002, Aliens moved the McCandlesses into The Home without the
knowledge or authorization of Elizabeth Mueller. Susan Allen prepared a rental
agreement and only David Allen and Halene McCandless signed. Susan Allen collected
$1,400.00 rent. All parties then knew that Elizabeth Mueller owned and held a one-half
interest in the property and was entitled to occupancy and possession along with David
Allen or his permitted assigns. Notwithstanding, David Allen gave the McCandlesses
unrestricted sole occupancy. Attempting to deal and work with a circumstance which she
had not created, Elizabeth Mueller then signed and accepted the second written offer
Susan Allen had prepared for McCandlesses which again required 100% loan financing.
The loan was denied because of McCandlesses poor credit, a circumstance of which
Susan Allen was well acquainted. Still the Aliens permitted the McCandlesses to
continue occupancy of the home. Susan Allen admitted that she typically did not
recommend that a seller place a prospective buyer in a home prior to closing because of
the risk it could impose to the seller.
In May 3, 2002, Elizabeth Mueller telephoned Susan Allen asking that David
Allen join with her to evict the McCandlesses. Neither Susan Allen or David Allen
responded, other than to permit the McCandlesses to continue in the property during the
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next four months without paying any amount. In July 2002, the lender holding the
mortgage loans agaihst the home commenced foreclosure of one of the loans.
In August 2002, the Aliens received two letters from Susan Allen's attorney and
additionally were apprised by the McCandlesses of their receipt of Elizabeth Mueller's
Notice to Pay Delincj[uent Rental or Quit Possession. Aliens testified that they understood
by the letters that Elizabeth Mueller was attempting to determine whether rentals had
been paid and if not, to have McCandlesses evicted. David Allen testified that he
intended that the McCandlesses have sole and exclusive occupancy of The Home and that
he would never have evicted them or agree to let anyone else do so. Susan Allen testified
that David Allen indicated to her that if the property was "sold great, if it went to
foreclosure, so be it". They both knew that no rental had been requested or paid for the
months of May through July.
Finally, in September 2002, David Allen, with Susan Allen's knowledge, collected
another $2,800.00 from the McCandlesses. No amounts were offered or paid to Elizabeth
Mueller. By this tinie the Aliens had learned that the McCandlesses had been denied a
loan for the third time. McCandlesses' credit worthiness had not in any way improved.
Susan Allen's attempt to qualify them for a "B loan" had been unsuccessful. The
McCandlesses had no money with which to purchase the property or to pay delinquent
rental payments. Obviously, the Aliens expected the home to be lost to foreclosure and
had no intention of salvaging it by pursuing another buyer or otherwise working with
Elizabeth Mueller to free the property up for another buyer or tenant.
Elizabeth Mueller, then 22 years of age and concerned that a loan foreclosure
would destroy her credit, was compelled to file this action. Now, the Aliens were
obviously aware that they needed to do something to resolve the claims being prosecuted
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against them. Nevertheless, and wanting to put some additional money in his pocket,
David Allen, with the knowledge of Susan Allen, went back to the McCandlesses at the
end of November and obtained another $1,400.00 and again retained it for himself. Then
on December 4, 2002, David Allen and the McCandlesses signed a real estate purchase
contract which David Allen prepared. Still, the McCandlesses financial circumstances
had not changed, they had no ability to pay past delinquencies and no money with which
to buy the home. However, with Elizabeth Mueller prosecuting this action they needed to
create a circumstance by which the McCandlesses could obtain financing and complete
the purchase of the property.
That which was the third purchase agreement, provided for a sales price of
$169,700.00, being 10% greater than the $152,000.00 which the McCandlesses were
intending to pay for the property. The obvious design was to cause the lender to believe
that the McCandlesses would have a 10% equity position in the home rather than a loan
constituting 100% of the value of the property, which was what had been denied the
McCandlesses on three previous occasions.
To facilitate the facade of the 10% equity, Susan Allen took to the McCandlesses
the morning of the real estate closing, a check for $14,100.00 written on the company
owned by her husband. The check was immediately converted into a cashiers check
which the McCandlesses then presented to the title insurance company at the closing.
Ms. McCandless testified that the morning of the closing was the first that she and her
husband knew that any money would be required of them at the closing. She said they
were never willing or able to pay more than $152,000.00 for The Home.
To make the proposed loan work, it was necessary to represent that the
McCandlesses were receiving a gift of 5% of the purchase price and that David Allen
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would be financing the other 5%. Therefore McCandlesses executed a promissory note to
David Allen and a trust deed against the home securing payment of the note. However,
Mrs. McCandless testified that they were told by David Allen that they did not owe him
any money under the promissory note. Although David Allen's first testimony at trial
was that he was owed the money under the promissory note, he later admitted that in his
prior deposition testimony he said he was not so owed. He testified that he had never
received any payments from the McCandlesses or had demanded such. The day
following the real estate closing and from his proceeds of the sale, David Allen paid to his
mother and father the $14,100.00 which they had advanced to the McCandlesses. The
entire transaction wds a sham to deceive McCandlesses5 lender. It worked and
McCandlesses acquired the property with a loan obligation of no more than $152,730.00.
The evidence clearly demonstrated that David Allen and Susan Allen had a
knowing and reckless indifference to Elizabeth Mueller's rights in her home. The risk
and concern which stich imposed on Elizabeth Mueller was apparent and obvious and was
made all the more difficult because they were previously her husband and mother-in-law.
The probability of any future such reoccurrence or misconduct is arguable.
Notwithstanding, Su$an Allen being a Utah licensed real estate sales person for some
fourteen years was the only "professional" with regard to the circumstance and clearly
knew better, undertook to engage in activities clearly and consistently inappropriate to her
licensing and the punitive damages awarded clearly should be a deterrent to further
similar engagement in her real estate transactions.
The jury received the evidence necessary to support its verdict. Aliens failed to
properly marshal the evidence in support of their attack on the verdict or to demonstrate
that the verdict was cilearly erroneous.
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CONCLUSION
Both the Special Verdict Of The Jury and the Special Verdict Of The Jury On
Punitive Damages were clearly supported by the evidence and properly responsive to the
Trial Court's instruction on the law. David Allen and Susan Allen have not shown
otherwise. The Trial Court had jurisdiction to determine the issues presented at trial and
Aliens have not submitted any judicial precedent in support of their premise to the
contrary. They have, however, failed to sufficiently marshal evidence in support of the
jury's findings here challenged, have failed to show that any challenged finding is clearly
erroneous and neither can nor have demonstrated that the evidence does not support the
findings. Elizabeth Mueller respectively request this Court to affirm the verdicts and the
Trial Court's February 27, 2004 Judgment on Special Verdict.
DATED this

of January, 2005.
NIELSEN & SENIOR

reiton
'Attojafeys for Plaintiff/Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ^J

(fey of January 2005 I did cause a true

and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE to be mailed, United
States mails, postage prepaid, addressed to the following:
Mary C. Corporon, Esq.
Corporon & Williams
808 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
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03 FEB
MARY C. CORPORON #734
Attorney for Defendants David G. Allen & Susan S. Allen
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C.
808 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801)328-1162
Facsimile: (801) 328-9565
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH.

ELIZABETH RUTH MUELLER, also
known as ELIZABETH MULLER,
formerly known as ELIZABETH RUTH
M. ALLEN,

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE
PLEADING, OR FOR PARTIAL
DISMISSAL OR FOR PARTIAL
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
-vs-

Case No. 020910005

DAVID G. ALLEN; SUSAN S.
ALLEN; RANDY N. McCANDLESS;
and HALENE McCANDLESS,

Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki

Defendants.
Defendants to the above action, Susan Allen and David Allen, by and through counsel,
hereby move the above court for a partial dismissal of Plaintiff's claims and causes of action,
consisting of all claims against Defendant, David Allen, and the first and second claims against
Defendant, Susan Allen, and in support of such motion, Defendants allege that this Court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction of the claims and causes of action sought to be dismissed, that the

claims to be dismissed are res judicata and are collaterally estopped by reason of the divorce
proceeding filed between Plaintiff herein and Defendant, David Allen.
In support of this motion, Defendants rely upon their memorandum filed in conjunction
herewith.

DATED THIS

*J \

day of

^A (AT" '

2003.

\J CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C.

ORON
efendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a copy of the foregoing to:

GARY A. WESTON
Attorney at Law
60 East South Temple, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
-andRANDY N. & HALENE MCCANDLESS
Defendants Pro Se
13408 South 1300 West
Riverton, Utah 84065

the ylfryof^b?
7 ' day of ^KM^UCfJW-

, 2003.
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Gary A. Weston (#343f)
NIELSEN & SENIOR
60 East South Temple, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-11900
Facsimile: (801)532-1913

FILifiilSTRIGTCaUIT
Third Judicial District

MAY 2 0 2003
l ^ a A L l L A K E C6UNTY

By

S ^ £ > \\j4r

puty Clerk
'Cfei

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ELIZABETH RUTH MUELLER, also
known as ELIZABETH MUELLER,
formerly known as ELIZABETH RUTH
M. ALLEN,
Plaintiff]
vs.

;
]
;)
;)
)
])

DAVID G. ALLEN; SUSAN S. ALLEN;
RANDY N. McCANDLESS; and
HALENE McCANDLESS,

]
)
;
;i
;

Defendants.

]

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADING, OR
FOR PARTIAL DISMISSAL OR FOR
PARTIAL JUDGMENT

Civil No. 020910005 EV
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki

The Motion of t^ie Defendants Susan S. Allen and David G. Allen for judgment on the
pleading, or for partial dismissal or for partial judgment came on regularly for hearing before the
Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki on the 28th day of April, 2003, with Gary A. Weston of the firm of
Nielsen & Senior appearing on behalf of the Plaintiff, Elizabeth R. Mueller and with Mary C.
Corporon of the firm of |Corporon & Williams appearing on behalf of the Defendants Susan S.

4831-2025-8304 MU204 001

Allen and David G. Allen. The Defendants Randy N. McCandless and Halene McCandless did
not appear in person or by counsel.
The Court, having reviewed the written memoranda and heard oral argument directed at
the Motion, determines for the following reasons that Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Ann., does not
require that the claims herein made by Plaintiff against Defendant David G. Allen be raised only
in the prior divorce action between Plaintiff and said Defendant:
1.

The claims are based upon circumstances and events arising after the entry of the

decree of divorce in the divorce action.
2.

The claims are new claims not before the court in the divorce action and seek

relief in tort.
3.

The claims involve Defendant David G. Allen and certain other Defendants joined

in this action and which other Defendants were not parties to the divorce action.
4.

The claims neither seek nor require the modification of the decree of divorce

entered in the divorce action.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion of the Defendants,
Susan S. Allen and David G. Allen, should be and hereby is denied.
DATED this ^y

d a y 0f

May, 2003.

^ \ T

GLENN K. IWASAKI
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

4831-2025-8304 MU204 001

-2-

'>

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
FILED DISTRICT GQURT

ELIZABETH RUTH MUELLER, also
known as ELIZABETH MUELLER,
formerly known as ELIZABETH RUTH
M. ALLEN,

Third Judicial District

JAN 3 0 2004
SPECIAL VERDICT
OF THE JURY
puty Clerk

Plaintiff,
Civil No. 020910005 EV

vs.

Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki

DAVID G. ALLEN; SUSAN S. ALLEN;
RANDY N. McCANDLESS; and
HALENE McCANDLESS,
Defendants.

We, the jury, duly empaneled in the above-entitled action, find the issues of fact and
return our special verdict as follows:
I.

The Elizabeth Mueller Claim Against David Allen and Susan Allen for Tortious
Interference with Elizabeth Mueller's Economic Relations.
1.
l|)id David Allen intentionally interfere by an improper means with
Elizabeth Mueller's economic relations regarding the property and thereby cause her to
sustain damaged
Yes

JC

No

If you have answered yes, then what was the amount of damages, as defined in
this Court's instructions, which Elizabeth Mueller has sustained as a result of the tortious
interference?

2. riid Susan Allen intentionally interfere by an improper means with
Elizabeth Mueller's economic relations regarding the property and thereby cause her to
sustain damage?

Yes

_ X

No

If you have answered yes, then what was the amount of damages, as defined in
this Court's instructions, which Elizabeth Mueller has sustained as a result of the tortious
interference?
$

*#-

The Elizabeth Mueller Claim Against David Allen and Susan Allen for Trespass
Against Elizabeth Mueller's Interest in the Property.
3.
Did David Allen trespass against Elizabeth Mueller's right to possession
of the property by causing Randy McCandless and Halene McCandless to take possession
of the property?
Yes

^

No

If you have answered yes, then what was the amount of damages, as defined in
this Court's instructions, which Elizabeth Mueller has sustained as a result of the
trespass?
$

/<?;<?&&

4.
Did Susan Allen trespass against Elizabeth Mueller's right to possession
of the property by causing Randy McCandless and Halene McCandless to take possession
of the property?
Yes

^

No

If you have answered yes, then what was the amount of damages, as defined in
this Court's instructions, which Elizabeth Mueller has sustained as a result of the
trespass?

$ ict^^a
The Elizabeth Mueller Claim Against Randy McCandless and Halene McCandless
for Trespass Against Elizabeth Mueller's Interest in the Property.
5.
Did Randy McCandless trespass against Elizabeth Mueller's right to
possession of the property?
Yes

yC

No

If you have answered yes, then what was the amount of damages, as defined in
this Court's instructions, which Elizabeth Mueller has sustained as a result of the
trespass?

fe fa&
6.
bid Halene McCandless trespass against Elizabeth Mueller's right to
possession of the property?
Yes

y£

No

_______

If you have answered yes, then what was the amount of damages, as defined in
this Court's instructions, which Elizabeth Mueller has sustained as a result of the
trespass?

$_J2&2
The Elizabeth Mueller Claim for Unlawful Detainer Against Randy McCandless
and Halene McCandless.
7.
If>o Randy McCandless and Halene McCandless owe rental to Elizabeth
Mueller for their occupancy of the property?
Yes

*f

No

If your answer is yes, then what is the amount of rental owed to Elizabeth
Mueller?

$L__2^
8.
Did Randy McCandless and Halene McCandless become unlawful
detainers of the property on August 26, 2002?
Yes

X

No

_____

If you have answered yes, then what was the amount of the damages, as defined in
this Court's instructions, which Elizabeth Mueller has sustained as a consequence of the
unlawful detainer?
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The Susan Allen Claim Against Elizabeth Mueller for Defamation.
9.
Did Elizabeth Mueller make a defamatory statement about Susan Allen
that caused her to sustain damage?
Yes

No

Xf

If you have answered yes, then what was the amount of the damages, as defined in
this Court's instructions, which Susan Allen has sustained as a consequence of the
defamation?
$

The Susan Allen Claim Against Elizabeth Mueller for Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress.
10.
Did Elizabeth Mueller intentionally engage in conduct toward Susan Allen
causing her to suffer severe or extreme emotional distress and thereby causing her to
sustain damage?
Yes

No

} \

If you have answered yes, then what was the amount of the damages, as defined in
this Court's instructions, which Susan Allen has sustained as a consequence of such
emotional distress.
$

Elizabeth Mueller's Claims for Punitive Damages.
11.
Punitive Damages Against David Allen. Should Elizabeth Mueller be
awarded punitive damages against David Allen?
Yes

X

No

12.
Punitive Damages Against Susan Allen. Should Elizabeth Mueller be
awarded punitive damages against Susan Allen?
Yes

X

No

-4-

VIII. Susan Allen's Claim for Punitive Damages.
13.
Mueller?

Should Susan Allen be awarded punitive damages against Elizabeth

Yes

DATED this ? ^

No

K

day of January, 2004.

Foreperson of the Jury
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f 1LE0 DISTRICT COURT

Third Judicial District
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

JAf( 3 0 2004
S A U . ^ E COUtfY

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH - ^
By—

ELIZABETH RUTH MUELLER, also
known as ELIZABETH MUELLER,
formerly known as ELIZABETH RUTH
M. ALLEN,

L V

* p u t > Clerk'-

SPECIAL VERDICT OF THE JURY
ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Plaintiff,
Civil No. 020910005 EV

vs.
DAVID G. ALLEN; SUSAN S. ALLEN;
RANDY N. McCANDLESS; and
HALENE McCANDLESS,

Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki

Defendants.

We, the jury, duly empaneled in the above-entitled action, find the issues of fact with
regard to the amount of punitive damages to be awarded to Plaintiff, Elizabeth Mueller, and
return our special verdict as follows:
1.
What is the amount of punitive damages, as defined in this Court's instructions,
which you award to Elizabeth Mueller and against David Allen?

$

^CXrO

2.
What is the amount of punitive damages, as defined in this Court's instructions,
which you award to Elizabeth Mueller and against Susan Allen?

$

.3<?, OC?6?

DATED this

3 ^ day of January, 2004.

Foreperson of the Jury
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FILED DISTRICT COt'BT
Gary A. Weston (#343£)
NIELSEN & SENIOR
60 East South Temple, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-1900
Facsimile: (801)532-1913

Third Judicial District

LAKE BOUNTY

Deputy Cicrfc

ENTERED IN REGISTRY
OF JUDGMENTS
DATE
0 &/o 1 jo^

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

: FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
IN AND

4

ELIZABETH RUTH MUELLER, also
known as ELIZABETH MUELLER,
formerly known as ELIZABETH RUTH
M. ALLEN,

JUDGMENT ON SPECIAL VERDICT

Plaintiff!
vs.

Civil No. 020910005 EV

DAVID G. ALLEN; SUSAN S. ALLEN;
RANDY N. McCANDLESS; and
HALENE McCANDLESS,

Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki

Defendants.

This case was tried to the Court, before the Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki, sitting with a
jury, on January 27, 28, 29 and 30, 2004. Plaintiff, Elizabeth Ruth Mueller, was represented by
Gary A. Weston of the firm of Nielsen & Senior. Defendants, David G. Allen and Susan S.
Allen, were represented by Mary C. Corporon of the firm of Corporon & Williams. Defendants,
Randy N. McCandless and Halene McCandless, appeared pro se and without counsel.
After commencement of trial, Defendant David G. Allen withdrew his counterclaim
against the Plaintiff and the Court denied Plaintiff leave to introduce evidence with regard to the
Judgment on Special Verdict (4 parts) @J
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counterclaim. Upon the completion of the evidence, the Court further considered Plaintiffs
motion in limine directed at Defendant Susan S. Allen's claim for abuse of process. Upon
motion of the Plaintiff, the Court dismissed the claim with prejudice, treating the motion as one
to dismiss and determining that neither law or evidence had been submitted sufficient to support
the claim. Defendants David G. Allen and Susan S. Allen renewed their motion that the Court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The Court had long before denied said Defendants' motion.
Notwithstanding, the Court heard argument of counsel and again denied the motion.
Having submitted issues to the jury for its special verdict relative to the First, Second and
Third Claims for Relief of Plaintiff s complaint against Defendants and the Second and Third
Causes of Action of Defendant Susan S. Allen's counterclaim against Plaintiff, and the jury
having duly rendered its verdict on January 30, 2004;
NOW, THEREFORE, in accordance with the special verdict of the jury, it is hereby
ordered and adjudged:
1.

Plaintiff, Elizabeth Ruth Mueller, have and recover from Defendant, David G.

Allen, the sum of Eight Thousand One Hundred Dollars ($8,100.00) as found by the jury.
2.

Plaintiff have and recover from the Defendants, David G. Allen and Susan S.

Allen, jointly and severally, the sum of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) as found by the jury.
3.

Plaintiff have and recover from the Defendant, David G. Allen, punitive damages

in the sum of Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) as found by the jury.
4.

Plaintiff have and recover from the Defendant, Susan S. Allen, punitive damages

in the sum of Thirty Thousand Dollars ($30,000.00) as found by the jury.

4852-0870-5536 MU204 001
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5.

Plaintiff have and recover from the Defendants, Randy N. McCandless and

Halene McCandless, jointly and severally, the sum of Eight Thousand Five Hundred Fifty
Dollars ($8,550.00), consisting of rental in the amount of Nine Hundred Dollars ($900.00) owing
to Plaintiff for the period of time prior to Defendants McCandless unlawfully detaining
possession of the property subject of the Plaintiffs complaint, and Seven Thousand Six Hundred
Fifty Dollars ($7,650.0p) for unlawfully detaining possession, all as found by the jury.
6.

Plaintiff! have and recover costs and disbursements as allowed by the Court.

This judgment ^hall bear interest from and after its date at the rate provided in
Section 15-1-4(3), UTAH
DATED this ^ '

4852-0870-5536 MU204 001

CODE ANN,

day of February, 2004.
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30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and
health care of parties and children — Division of
debts — Court to have continuing jurisdiction —
Custody and parent-time — Determination of
alimony — Nonmeritorious petition for modification.
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it
equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and
parties. The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children;
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order
requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital,
and dental care insurance for the dependent children;
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:
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(i) I an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of
joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or
incurred during marriage;
(iii an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or
obligees, regarding the court's division of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; and
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A,
Chapter 11, Recovery Services.
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order
assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses
incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment
or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately
cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide
child care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or
training of the custodial parent.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or
new orders for the custody of the children and their support, maintenance,
health, and dental care, and for distribution of the property and obligations for
debts as is reasonable and necessary.
(4) Child support, custody, visitation, and other matters related to children
born to the mother and father after entry of the decree of divorce may be added
to the decree by modification.
(5) (a) In determining parent-time rights of parents and visitation rights of
grandparents and other members of the immediate family, the court shall
consider the best interest of the child.
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer
enforcement, the court may include in an order establishing a parent-time
or visitation schedule a provision, among other things, authorizing any
peace officer to enforce a court-ordered parent-time or visitation schedule
entered under this chapter.
(6) If a petition for modification of child custody or parent-time provisions of
a court order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the
reasonable attorneys' fees expended by the prevailing party in t h a t action, if
the court determines t h a t the petition was without merit and not asserted or
defended against in good faith.
(7) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a parent-time order
by a parent, or a visitation order by a grandparent or other member of the
immediate family pursuant to Section 78-32-12.2 where a visitation or parenttime right has been previously granted by the court, the court may award to
the prevailing party costs, including actual attorney fees and court costs
incurred by the prevailing party because of the other party's failure to provide
or exercise court-ordered visitation or parent-time.
(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining
alimony:
(i) I the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
(iij the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support;
(iv) the length of the marriage;
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children
requiring support;
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or
operated by the payor spouse; and
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(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any
increase in the payor spouse's skill by paying for education received by
the payor spouse or allowing the payor spouse to attend school during
the marriage.
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining
alimony.
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living,
existing at the time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance
with Subsection (8)(a). However, the court shall consider all relevant facts
and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the
standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short
duration, when no children have been conceived or born during the
marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that existed at the
time of the marriage.
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties' respective standards of living.
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a
major change in the income of one of the spouses due to the collective
efforts of both, that change shall be considered in dividing the marital
property and in determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's
earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both
spouses during the marriage, the court may make a compensating
adjustment in dividing the marital property and awarding alimony.
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves,
and no children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the
court may consider restoring each party to the condition which existed at
the time of the marriage.
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive
changes and new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial
material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the
divorce.
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for
alimony to address needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time
the decree was entered, unless the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify that action.
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse
of the payor may not be considered, except as provided in this
Subsection (8).
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial
ability to share living expenses.
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse
if the court finds that the payor's improper conduct justifies that
consideration.
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number
of years that the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination
of alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the
payment of alimony for a longer period of time.
(9) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of
the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates
upon the remarriage or death of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall
resume if the party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment
and his rights are determined.
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(10) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former
spouse is cohabitating with another person.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1212; L.
1909, ch. 109, § 4; C.L. 1917, § 3000; R.S.
1933 & C. 1943, 40-3-5; L. 1969, ch. 72, § 3;
1975, ch. 81, § 1; 1979, ch. 110, § 1; 1984, ch.
13, § 1; 1985, ch. 72, § 1; 1985, ch. 100, § 1;
1991, ch. 257, § 4; 1993, ch. 152, § 1; 1993,
ch. 261, § 1; 1994, ch. 284, § 1; 1995, ch. 330,
§ 1; 1997, ch. 232, § 4; 1999, ch. 168, § 1;
1999, ch. 277, § 1; 2001, ch. 255, § 4; 2003,
ch. 176, § 3.
Amendment Notes. — The 1999 amendment by ch. 168, effective May 3,1999, inserted
"or death" in the first sentence of Subsection (8)
and made a stylistic change.
The 1999 amendment by ch. 277, effective
May 3, 1999, added Subsections (7)(a)(v)

through (7)(a)(vii) and made stylistic changes.
The 2001 amendment, effective April 30,
2001, in Subsection (4)(a), substituted "parenttime rights of parents and visitation rights of
grandparents" for "visitation rights of parents,
grandparents"; in Subsection (4)(b), added "parent-time or" in two places; in Subsection (5),
substituted "parent-time" for "visitation"; in
Subsection (6), substituted "parent-time order
by a parent, or a visitation order by" for Visitation order by a parent" and added "or parenttime" in two places; and made punctuation
changes.
The 2003 amendment, effective May 5, 2003,
added Subsection (4) and made related redesignation and internal reference changes.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Alimony and support.
—Amount.
Imputed income.
Specific situations.
—Cohabitation by payee.
Definition.
—Credits.
—Discretion of court.
Duration.
—Factors considered.
—Modification.
Time limitation.
Attorney fees.
Children.
—Jurisdiction.
Modification of decree generally.
—Change in circumstances.
—Findings.
—Fraud.
Retroactivity of amendment.
Cited.
Alimony and support.
—Amount.
Trial court's award of alimony, after it considered the duration of the marriage, the recipient's earning capacity and the payor's ability to
provide support, the recipient's "ability to improve her capacity to meet her own needs," and
the recipient's fault in engaging in an extramarital affair, was proper; the fact that the
recipient believed the amount was insufficient
to meet her needs, without more, was insufficient to prove serious inequity in the amount of
alimony awarded. Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d
942 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), cert, denied, 982 P.2d
88 (Utah 1999).
Imputed income.
The trial court did not err in imputing lesser

earnings to a wife after consideration of the
roles both parties had played in the marriage.
Rehn v. Rehn, 1999 UT App 41, 974 P.2d 306.
Specific situations.
Where the wife's gross monthly income was
$2,769 and the husband's gross monthly income
less child support was $3,579, an award of $400
per month to the wife was not error. Griffith v.
Griffith, 959 P.2d 1015 (Utah Ct. App. 1998),
afiTd, 985 P.2d 255 (Utah 1999).
—Cohabitation by payee.
Provision terminating a former husband's
obligation to pay alimony upon establishing
that his former wife was cohabiting with another person did not require proof that the
former wife was cohabiting with another person of the opposite sex. Garcia v. Garcia, 2002
UT App 381, 60P3d 1174.
Definition.
Trial court properly used the definition of
"cohabitation" from previous case law in the
context of termination of alimony; the definition of "cohabitant" found in the Cohabitant
Abuse Act is expressly limited to use in that Act
and is inapplicable in the context of alimony
proceedings. Hill v. Hill, 968 P.2d 866 (Utah Ct.
App. 1998).
—Credits.
In view of wife's age, health, employment,
and financial resources, there was no abuse of
discretion in the trial court's awarding husband
credit for alimony paid under a temporary
order during the pendency of the divorce proceedings and declining to award any further
alimony. Thomas v. Thomas, 1999 UT App 239,
987 P.2d 603.
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CHAPTER 18
PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARDS
Section
78-18-1.

Basis for punitive damages
awards — Section inapplicable

to DUI cases — Division of
award with state,

78-18-1. Basis for punitive damages awards — Section
inapplicable to DUI cases — Division of award
with state,
(1) (a) Except as otherwise provided by statute, punitive damages may be
awarded only if compensatory or general damages are awarded and it is
established by clear and convincing evidence that the acts or omissions of
the tortfeasor are the result of willful and malicious or intentionally
fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless
indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of others.
(b) The limitations, standards of evidence, and standards of conduct of
Subsection (l)(a) do not apply to any claim for punitive damages arising
out of the tortfeasor's operation of a motor vehicle or motorboat while
voluntarily intoxicated or under the influence of any drug or combination
of alcohol and drugs as prohibited by Section 41-6-44.
(c) The award of a penalty under Section 78-11-15 or 78-11-16 regarding
shoplifting is not subject to the prior award of compensatory or general
damages under Subsection (l)(a) whether or not restitution has been paid
to the merchant prior to or as a part of a civil action under Section 78-11-15
or 78-11-16.
(2) Evidence of a party's wealth or financial condition shall be admissible
only after a finding of liability for punitive damages has been made.
(3) (a) In any case where punitive damages are awarded, the judgment
shall provide that 50% of the amount of the punitive damages in excess of
$20,000 shall, after an allowable deduction for the payment of attorneys'
fees and costs, be remitted by the judgment debtor to the state treasurer
for deposit into the General Fund.
(b) For the purposes of this Subsection (3), an "allowable deduction for
the payment of attorneys' fees and costs" shall equal the amount of actual
and reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred by the judgment creditor
minus the amount of any separate judgment awarding attorneys' fees and
costs to the judgment creditor.
(c) The state shall have all rights due a judgment creditor until the
judgment is satisfied, and stand on equal footing with the judgment
creditor of the original case in securing a recovery.
(d) Unless all affected parties, including the state, expressly agree
otherwise or the application is contrary to the terms of the judgment, any
payment on the judgment by or on behalf of any judgment debtor, whether
voluntary or by execution or otherwise, shall be applied in the following
order:
(i) compensatory damages, and any applicable attorneys fees and
costs;
(ii) the initial $20,000 punitive damages; and finally
(iii) the balance of the punitive damages.

